

Official Diary

Friday, 2 January 1953

1. Spoke to Mr. Reber re his recommendation that no report be prepared under NSC 50. I explained my view that the NSC 135 report constituted an accounting on behalf of the IAC generally, but that the NSC 50 report constituted a personal accounting to the President by DCI for his stewardship. Accordingly, I felt that both reports should be prepared. It was immaterial whether the latter report dealt specifically with the respective items under NSC 50. [redacted] undertook to proceed in accordance with the foregoing.

2. Noted in the Watchpot the statement that PR indicated no causeway between Sakhalin and the mainland. If this is correct there would appear to have been some error in our intelligence evaluation over a period of time and requested that their facts be reviewed and [redacted] indicated that this was underway. 25X1A9a

3. At the morning meeting, there was a brief reference to the Russian approaches to American diplomatic and other government officials which seemed to constitute a world-wide pattern.

4. At the Deputies' meeting, commented that we ~~will~~ keep close watch on the build-up in Korea and the situations in Colombia and Bolivia. Although the Colombian revolution had not come off on the date forecast, O/CI felt that there was a continuing danger.

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5. Discussed, with [redacted] the employment, as a consultant or otherwise, of [redacted] who is to be Chairman of the Summary Evaluation Program. Suggested that [redacted] discuss this with [redacted] requested a brief paper outlining the facts and I undertook to have this prepared. Later requested that Amory prepare such a paper. (Continued) 25X1A9a

6. Discussed briefly with [redacted] the "B" Project and it was agreed that nothing further could be done until Monday.

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7. Checked with [redacted] to insure that I was not holding up the dissemination of the AE Estimate to the IAC. [redacted] assured me that the Estimate was going forward. 25X1A9a

8. Discussed at some length with [redacted] the Chinese Communist build-up with respect to Korea and also agreed with their position that CIA Senior Representatives overseas required an intelligence staff responsible to DD/I and have a direct contact with DD/I Offices. 25X1A9a

9. Later in the afternoon, informed Mr. Dulles and [redacted] that there were reports of uprisings in Colombia. 25X1A9a

25X1A9a 10. In response to a telephone call by [redacted] to expedite the provision of trading material with the Scandinavians and he later reported that this had been done.

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